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Abstract The accounting court proposed by Spacek (Account Rev 33(3):368, 1958)
was a potent and controversial idea. The court would provide a venue to which auditing
firms and clients could bring disputes over the application of accounting principles
and over time would build a database of casework illustrating the court’s decisions
on proper application and interpretation of accounting principles. In this paper, we
contribute to the literature on the accounting court and on standard setting by analyzing group value orientations and motivations that should promote the likelihood
of an accounting court appearing in these times. We base our analysis in value group
theory (Shakun 1988 Evolutionary systems design: policymaking under complexity
and group group decision support systems. Holden-Day, Oakland, CA.), an analysis
rooted in an examination of operational and terminal values of key participants. The
analysis brings to light a contradiction between the terminal values of the key players and the actions of those players. We argue that common conditions of existence
came between the operational goals and terminal values in the accounting domain
and key actors willingness to seek the specified values. This analysis provides a flexible but powerful tool for analyzing motivations that may influence behavior of key
organizations in the accounting domain.
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1 Introduction
The public accounting profession is in a singularly challenging position. The accountant must prepare financial statements that are true and fair, address the demands of the
client and the duty owed to the public while making the most of an incomplete conceptual framework, a plethora of accounting principles, and rules created by both public
and private bodies. In no other profession is there a work product that has a greater
impact on the capital markets and yet the conditions under which accountants must
account are difficult at best. The accounting firm must continually seek equilibrium
between client demands, professional responsibility and self-preservation.
Professional responsibility requires that the public accountant affirm that company
financial statements are free from material misstatement and contain relevant and
reliable financial information. The corporations that employ public accountants are
under pressure to present financial statements that protect stock value and corporate
reputation. The pressure could encourage the use of a variety of loopholes in accounting
regulation to adjust financial statement accounts and to manipulate the company’s
financial position so that the company appears more stable or liquid than it is in reality.
Spacek (1958) noted that existing shareholders want the facts about their investments, but they also want these facts to be presented in the best possible light. This is
because investors want the highest value for their investments. Spacek stated that users
of financial statements want the financial statements to be prepared on a basis that is
comparable with other companies in the same industry or in similar industries. Financial statement users require transparency and consistency to make resource allocation
decisions and accounting principles must meet this test of public needs. However, in
many cases accounting principles are not consistently applied and routinely violate
the objectives for which accounting principles were founded, namely to provide decision useful information upon which stakeholders can rely to make capital allocation
choices.1 Spacek, in a key note speech at the 1958 American Accounting Association
Annual conference held at the University of Wisconsin (subsequently published in the
July issue of the Accounting Review in the same year), raised a critical point, namely,
accountants must be able to give reasons for the accounting procedures adopted by a
client. The usefulness of accounting principles as they are applied to corporate financial statements should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Where there is doubt with
respect to the applicability of an accounting principle, the justification should be discussed and argued cogently to ensure that the principle corresponds to the objectives
of proper accounting. There is no place where the application (or misapplication) of
accounting principles can be brought to issue.
1 It has been argued recently that accounting standards do not to produce decision useful information either
at the individual or macro level.Williams and Ravenscroft (2015) state that there is incoherence in the
standard setting process and that accountability and economic facts, not decision usefulness, should be the
objective of accounting standards.
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Spacek gave a well-reasoned argument to establish an accounting court. However,
establishing the court in the US is an elusive goal. Research is generally supportive
of building a body of casework upon which accounting principles could be evaluated
and revised as economic conditions warrant (Spacek 1958; Friedland 2004; Kleinman
et al. 2012) although not all agree that the accounting court is the vehicle by which to
achieve this goal (Pye 1960). This seems a perfectly good idea, with general support in
the past and a favorable, well-reasoned argument in support of the creation of the court.
Why doesn’t the accounting court exist? The answer may lie in the tension that
exists between the various groups responsible for financial standards and the content
of published financial statements. The groups include regulators (Financial Accounting
Standards Board [FASB], Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC]), professional
organizations (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants [AICPA], State
Societies), the market (clients, public stakeholders, analysts) and the public accountant.
Arguments for the creation of an accounting court have been proffered before (e.g.,
Friedland 2004; Spacek 1958). Previous literature has not provided grist for thought
as to why such a court has never been implemented.
In this paper, we contribute to the literature on both the accounting court and on
standard setting in accounting—to which the accounting court concept is intricately
tied—by analyzing group value orientations and motivations that should promote the
likelihood of an accounting court appearing in these times. We root our analysis in
value group theory (Shakun 1988) as originally applied in the accounting domain
by Kleinman and Palmon (2000). Uniquely in the literature, Shakun’s value group
analysis, an analysis rooted in an examination of the so-called operational and terminal
values of key participants (here organizations), provides a flexible but powerful tool
for analyzing motivations that may influence behavior of key organizations in the
accounting domain.
In Sect. 2 we describe the accounting court, as originally propounded in Spacek
(1958).2 In Sect. 3, we present the argument as to why having an accounting court
should be useful in addressing current accounting issues Without a strong argument
for having an accounting court, there would be no need to explore why different
value groups may not be supportive of the installation of such a court. In Sect. 4, we
describe the current situation and why it is so complicated. In Sect. 5, we describe
various value groups and the operational goals and terminal values (Shakun 1988) that
they are presumed to harbor, and how or why these values may not comport well with
the creation of an accounting court in these times. Finally, in Sect. 6, we conclude
with both a summary of the paper and recommendations for research in this domain.

2 What is an Accounting Court
Public accountants have a responsibility to select the accounting treatment that gives
the most accurate depiction of company capital and income. Company management
2 Note that Spacek maintained the need for an accounting court for the remainder of his life (see, for
example, Spacek 1969, 1973). His description of the court and the reasons for creation of such an entity
changed over time. The institutions that Spacek fought against (e.g., see Zeff 2001) have changed over the
years. Thus, they do not serve as motivation for an accounting court now, so we ignore them.

123

848

G. Kleinman et al.

can argue for an alternative accounting treatment that is equally a part of Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), even if the difference between the two
methods is material. An auditor cannot force the company to apply one GAAP method
over another.
Spacek felt that management had too much discretion in the application of GAAP
and that this did not always produce financial statements that were truthful and fair.
Spacek suggested the accounting court as a way to mitigate creative use of accounting
principles. The accounting court, as visualized by Spacek (1958), would promote
fair reporting of economic facts; provide reasoning for application of accounting
principles, and settle disputes between companies and stakeholders interested in the
company financial statements. According to Spacek, the accounting court would
be a venue where corporate managers, external auditors, investors, creditors, and
other stakeholders could bring a question about the application of an accounting
principle. The facts of each situation would be heard by accounting experts and
scrutinized. The accounting court would apply accounting theory and accounting
case history and determine (rule on) the proper application of accounting principle
on a case-by-case basis. This case-based process, Spacek argued, would build up
a body of reasoning that would be useful in the standard-setting process, thereby
improving on the standard setting system the Committee on Accounting Procedure (CAP) used at the time Spacek gave his speech. The latter system, Spacek
held, resulted in ad hoc rules applied to immediate accounting circumstance, not
the broad-based theory development he is said to have favored at the time (Zeff
2001).

3 Is There a Need for an Accounting Court in Today’s Environment
The public accountant’s responsibility is to express an opinion on the fairness of the
results of the operation of a corporation and its related financial position. Spacek
pointed out that nowhere do we find a definition or explanation of the criteria of what
“fair presentation” of income means and this is still true today. In 1958, Spacek said
he could not find a single bulletin issued by an accounting organization that defined
fair presentation of income and criteria that should be applied to determine what
fair presentation looks like. There are no standards to measure fairness and if it has
been achieved. Instead, attention is on rule ticking and rules-based accounting (Ball
2009). Most standards were, in Spacek’s opinion, overburdened with comments on
procedures on how to handle specific transactions, including journal entries. Standards
continue to be prescriptive. For example, Ball (2009) noted that there were at least
78 FASB Statements, Interpretations, and Emerging Issue Task Force documents or
commentaries that relate to accounting for leases. This number continues to increase
as accounting for leases is revisited again (as recently as December 16, 2014) by
the FASB and the International Accounting Standards Board. There is virtually no
discussion on what effect we are trying to seek or and more importantly, why we
desire it. Spacek wrote succinctly “The accounting profession should ask itself what
ends are we trying to achieve and what criteria should be applied to achieve those
ends.”
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The notion that the practice of accounting is cut and dried is fallacy. Pollock (2007)
refers to a report by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales
(ICAEW), that recognizes the ambiguous nature of accounting. Pollock states that
“upon close inspection, many accounting concepts are fuzzy, obscure, and subjective.
Accounting debates are often hard to follow, resembling metaphysical disputes in an
odd dialect of English (‘an assumption of no ineffectiveness’ is one of my favorite
phrases), and are carried out with a surprising level of emotion.” Pollock also notes,
“accounting rules are not just matters of numbers and techniques; they are necessarily matters of politics, philosophy, and fundamentally imprecise ideas.” It could be
argued that there is no need for an accounting court, because there are regular courts,
such as the courts that deal with questions of medical practice. The accounting court
proposed in Spacek’s (1958) article is not a court of law, but a court of theory and
practice, a court in which specific constellations of fact are married to accounting
theory and rules. In a way, this is done by any court. A major difference is that having a specialized court well-versed in arcane accounting rules, theories, philosophies,
and the like would provide expert ears and an appropriately-trained mind to the difficult task of deciding on preferable accounting practice. Such a ‘specialized court’
would not be new in the United States. In the United States, specialized courts exist.
Among these are the Court of International Trade, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, the Alien Terrorist Removal Court, Immigration courts, and—of greater
relevance to an accounting court specifically, the US Tax Court, Bankruptcy Courts,
and the Court of Federal Claims. A difference would be that the Accounting Court,
at least as specified in Spacek (1958), a specification that differed from his later writings, would not be a creature of the government. Its exact funding and placement in
the constellation of regulatory organizations or information providers would need to
be determined. Nevertheless, as with the other courts, it would draw on those with
specific expertise to address the interplay of complex questions of fact and accounting
rules.
Such guidance provision has a distinct value. Public accountants are so preoccupied by methodology that we fail to correctly articulate the principle involved (Spacek
1958). For example, a user of financial statements assumes that each transaction is
recorded to reflect the true economic substance. The financial statement user has
the right to make comparisons among companies without having to complete difficult, if not impossible, mental adjustments to make the figures comparable. The
comments made by Spacek in 1958 are applicable (in fact more so) in today’s environment.
Friedland (2004) revisited Spacek’s call for an accounting court. He observed that
the issues identified by Spacek continue to exist, in spite of the passage of nearly a
half century since Spacek’s article. Friedland (2004) noted that an endemic problem in accounting resulting from alternative treatments for identical transactions
is as prevalent today as it was in Spacek’s time. With the option for alternative
treatments, clients pressure accountants for more favorable (i.e. higher income or
lower expense) treatment, especially when GAAP is open ended and there are insufficient criteria upon which to base the decision. The accounting court could set
precedent by rejecting and challenging arguments and establish sufficient criteria for
GAAP.
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This research contributes to the accounting court and standard setting literature in
several ways. First, an analysis of group terminal values and operational goals, based
on Shakun’s (1988) value group theory, informs as to the motivations that drive the
decisions of key accounting organizations. Second, this research investigates the likely
reasons why key accounting organizations, based on the aforementioned values that
can be said to be a proper motivation for their behavior, do not and have not supported
the creation of the accounting court. Finally, this paper adds to the body of current
research that calls for accounting professionals and groups to revisit the methods
by which accounting standards are created and how those standards are applied in
practice. Whereas Friedland (2004) presented arguments as to the continuing need for
an accounting court, we examine potential reasons why an accounting court did not
come into being, given the desirability of such a court.
The accounting profession depends on transparency and comparability. Yet, a black
box exists where accounting firms and clients make decisions regarding complex
accounting transactions. Negotiation between the client and firm commence and the
prevailing accounting treatment may or may not reflect the economic substance of the
transaction. The details of the negotiation are not revealed unless there is an inquiry
from an authoritative body. The profession relies on transparency, comparability and
clarity, yet, “…many of the most difficult issues are raised, addressed and resolved in
secrecy” (SEC Advisory Committee on Improvements to Financial Reporting 2008)
The accounting court is a venue by which firm and client can address the substantial
complexity of accounting transactions in the light of day. In 2007, the Institute of
Management Accountants submitted a comment letter to the SEC Advisory Committee Standard Setting Subcommittee that advocates for the accounting court to resolve
issues between firms and the SEC noting the “…diminished use of professional judgement” in the accounting profession. In 2009, the accounting court was again suggested
as an a means to an end—the end being a “…simpler financial reporting model based
on principles” (Sunder 2009).
Why do we need an accounting court today? Professional judgment is becoming an exercise in risk-taking. Accountants are stymied by the regulatory and legal
environment, transaction variation and complexity, voluminous standards, rules, interpretations and guidance, and an incomplete conceptual framework (Desroches 2007).
The FASB states that all standards have to be comprehensible to readers with a reasonable level of knowledge and sophistication (Financial Accounting Standards Advisory
Council 2006). Beresford cites FASB Interpretation No. 46, Consolidation of Variable
Interest Entities (FIN 46) to illustrate. Apparently, auditors and financial executives
admit that few individuals in the United States know how to apply FIN 46 and those few
individuals do not agree and argue amongst themselves! Beresford observes that such
complications make it difficult to get decisions, particularly on issues such as derivatives and securitization transactions that frequently need clearance from “national
experts” in an accounting firm. Even the experts vary in their decisions. An accounting court could be a forum to deliberate these and other complicated issues and decide
the best application of principle. A judge or panel of judges could weigh evidence
from both sides and come to a decision, which could then be applied to similar
circumstances. The decision is binding, as precedent, and creates consistency and
comparability.
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4 What Caused the Present Imbroglio and Why is it so Complicated?
In the late 1950s, the Accounting Principles Board—the successor to the Committee
on Accounting Procedure that had so irked Spacek—had not yet issued standards and
the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) did not yet exist.3 Today, under the
aegis of the FASB, there are countless procedures (relative to the late 50s). For example,
ten years ago, the rules and guidance on derivative financial instruments totaled over
800 pages (Beresford 2004). The FASB continues to discuss exposure documents and
final standards and met as recently as October 29, 2014 to continue the decade’s long
discussion of the rules and guidance on this topic. Beresford (2004), former head
of the Financial Accounting Standards Board, noted that the totality of authoritative
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) in the late 50s and early 60s could
fit in one softbound booklet. To put in context, this softbound booklet was one-third the
size of the guidance on derivatives alone. In addition, he noted that 50 years ago, the
SEC did not interfere with accounting issues; neither mandatory quarterly reporting
nor management’s discussion and analysis had yet come into being. The annual report
then could be read in less than half an hour. He noted that accounting standards and
proposals are getting increasingly complicated and harder to apply, thus even the bestintentioned accountants have difficulty keeping up with the changes from FASB, the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), the SEC, the Emerging
Issues Task Force (EITF) and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB).
Some individual standards are now so complicated (such as those on derivatives and
variable interest entities) that these standards are almost impossible for professionals,
let alone lay people, to decipher. This is solely attributable to accounting regulators.
Beresford (2004) cites a famous line from the comic strip Pogo: “We have met the
enemy, and he is us.”
According to Beresford, the situation now is more complicated than before, especially relative to the fifties, because companies are subject to what he refers to as
quadruple jeopardy. While companies have to apply GAAP as best they can, they
remain subject to as many as four levels of second-guessing of their judgments.
Beresford, in particular, notes the following sequence: after the external auditors have
completed the audit, the SEC reviews all public companies’ reports at least once every
three years. Then the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) will
look at a sample of accounting firm’s audits, which could include any company’s
financial reports. Finally, the plaintiff’s bar in any lawsuit (and there is a plethora of
lawsuits) will be looking for opportunities to challenge accounting judgments to exact
substantial settlements. All this second-guessing is what leads companies and auditors to ask for detailed accounting rules. Ball (2009) summarized the current financial
reporting system as an endogenous result of market, political and regulatory forces
3 Zeff (2001) described the history behind Spacek’s original proposal for an accounting court. He notes
that it arose from Spacek’s anger toward the Committee on Accounting Procedure, with the speech also
emerging during a period of angry confrontation between Spacek and Arthur Andersen on the one hand and
the AICPA on the other, with Spacek threatening to withdraw Arthur Andersen from the AICPA. Given that
the nub of the conflict was over the quality of accounting standard setting at the time, it is not surprising
that the AICPA preferred another solution—the creation of the Accounting Principles Board—rather than
to buy into Spacek’s Accounting Court.
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unlikely to change in substance unless the forces at work change (p. 312). As accounting rules become more prevalent, accountants continue to sacrifice the substance of
a transaction for the form. Thus, the quagmire that Spacek complained about half
a century ago continues into present day, only now the situation is infinitely more
complex.
Beresford indirectly makes a case for an accounting court by pointing out that
procuring clarifying information from one’s auditor is even harder with the advent of
section 404 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) and concerns regarding auditor independence. In the past, companies would consult with their auditors on difficult accounting
matters. According to Beresford, there is apparently a reluctance to consult the auditor on difficult matters, because of the perception that the PCAOB would view this
as a control weakness under the assumption that the company lacks adequate internal
expertise. According to Beresford, the irony is that if the auditors get involved in vital
technical decisions before a complex transaction is completed, there is a possibility
that the SEC or PCAOB could intervene, deciding that the auditors are not independent
because they are auditing their own decisions. Therefore, companies are not willing
to ask auditors for technical advice in a complex transaction and auditors, too, may
be unwilling to step in.
Responding to criticism in a PCAOB report regarding misapplication of EITF issue
95-22 by three Big Four audit firms, KPMG noted, “Three knowledgeable informed
bodies, one big four audit firm, the PCAOB and the SEC had reached three different
conclusions on proper accounting with respect to a complex derivative transaction.”
Beresford wrote that when things become this complicated, there is a need for a new
approach. In our opinion, this vacuum should be filled by an accounting court. Another
important reason for an accounting court is the advent of fair value accounting. It makes
sense to use fair value accounting for marketable securities, derivatives and other
financial instruments. However, because of the International Accounting Standards
Board (IASB) the fair value concept will be extrapolated to many other assets and
liabilities. There will be a need for an impartial arbiter, such as an accounting court, to
apply accounting principles in order to make complex decisions that can be uniformly
applied. Fair value issues now arise with SFAS 142 (requiring goodwill impairment
losses for intangible assets upon decline of fair value); SFAS 143 (requiring asset
retirement obligations be recorded at fair value); SFAS 146 (calling for fair value of
exit liabilities rather than the amount expected to be paid); SFAS 147 (requiring fair
value on guarantees). In none of these cases has the FASB provided clear guidelines
on how to estimate fair value; rather, they have given different techniques firms could
adopt for determining fair value. Obviously, subjective judgment will be applied in
each case and pressure will be applied to present the company financials in the most
favorable light. Beresford points out three major concerns about the future pervasive
use of fair value accounting. First, in many cases determining fair value in any kind
of objective way will be difficult, if not impossible. Second, the resulting accounting
will produce answers that will not benefit users of financial statements. Third, those
answers will be very difficult to explain to business managers, with the result that
accounting will be further discredited in their minds. This issue can be effectively
resolved with the establishment of an accounting court where all fair value issues
are resolved after expert testimony and deliberation on both sides. Once a judge or
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panel of judges makes a ruling, that ruling can be used as precedent and guidance by
auditors and firms in similar circumstances. Why, then, do we not have an accounting
court? We develop these thoughts further in Sect. 5 and offer an interest group-based
theory for the failure of an accounting court to appear in the current environment in
Sect. 6.

5 Issues to Ponder
At this point, we discuss the virtues and flaws of the existing standard setting system.
This will provide a setting to discuss how the accounting court should aid in improving
the system.
In 1973, the SEC issued Accounting Series Release (ASR) No. 150 that made clear
that the pronouncements issued by the FASB had substantial authoritative support
and that the FASB should be the organization to develop accounting standards in the
private sector. FASB statements represent the accounting profession’s authoritative
pronouncements on financial accounting and reporting practices. The FASB replaced
its predecessor, the Accounting Principles Board (APB), because the opinions of the
APB did not have substantial authoritative support. It was believed that the FASB
statements would carry greater weight because (1) the FASB has a smaller number
of full-time compensated members; (2) the FASB has been given greater autonomy
and increased independence; and (3) the FASB has broader representation than the
APB. However, the SEC has the authority to override and veto the FASB should
conflicts arise with regard to accounting practices and principles employed by corporations.
The FASB is constantly under pressure to change accounting standards and
influence new standards. This pressure comes from individual companies, industry associations, and governmental agencies, practicing accountants, professional
accounting organizations and public opinion. This is because there are economic
consequences of standard setting. Accounting information impacts users and new
standards can change wealth positions of users by transferring wealth. Many have
noted that currently politics plays an important role in the development of accounting standards and there are accusations that standards are subject to manipulation
despite supervision and “oversight” by the SEC (e.g., Kleinman and Hossain 2009).
Notwithstanding the good intentions of the standard setters, if information indicates
that investing in a particular enterprise involves less risk than it actually does, or is
designed to encourage investment in a particular segment of the economy, there is
always potential for immense pressure on standard setters. The perceived threat could
result in a loss of credibility. There is also an expectations gap, which is the difference
between what people think accountants should be doing and what accountants think
they can do.
The problems with the standard setting process are, therefore, many. There are
problems with the standards themselves, with standards often requiring application of
vague definitions to real life occurrences with the result that no one is satisfied These
are areas in which, as the late legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin would have it, the law
runs out, where the standard fails to explicitly cover circumstances of a transaction
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(Kleinman et al. 2012). In this case, what is one to do? An accounting court is one
alternative—one favored by many academics but one that has received scant attention
in the practitioner literature.4 Why, then has an accounting court not appeared? Why
is there a continued reliance on the FASB/SEC for the provision of GAAP for publicly
listed companies? In the next section, we present our analysis.

6 Value Networks, Practical Impediments, the Dark Side and the
Accounting Court
There is a history of research about potential political and pressure group influence
on FASB decision making. Theories regarding the nature of this relationship are summarized in Palmon et al. (2011). The authors note that the relationship between the
standard setter and the interested parties may be influenced by capture theory. Capture
theory holds that regulators may become captive to the industries that they regulate,
with regulators favoring the private regulated, and not the public, interest. The Palmon et al. paper argues, and finds, that ultimately the FASB is responsive to the SEC.
Previous literature cited in the paper establishes weak links between the interests of
the then Big 8 firms and FASB decisions (e.g., Hussein and Edward Ketz 1980; U.S.
Congress 1976). Kleinman and Hossain (2009, drawing on Kleinman and Palmon
2000) develop a richer theory of the motivations of various groups to influence the
FASB standard setting process.
The theory developed by Kleinman and Hossain does not rely largely on regulatory
capture theory. Nor does it rely on or incorporate discussions of social accountability
theory. Rather, it explores the rich organizational and professional environment of
the FASB and examines how the operational goals and terminal values (see Shakun
1988, for a more complete description) of organizational constituents of the FASB’s
environment may motivate behavior toward the FASB. Table 1 is an adaptation of
Kleinman and Palmon’s (2000) description of terminal values and operational goals
(see Shakun 1988) held by key organizations described here.
Applying the theory developed by Kleinman and Hossain (2009) to the primary
groups responsible for the accounting profession and its standards allows for an in
depth analysis of group values and operational goals not addressed in prior literature.
Understanding group values and operational goals provides an intellectual framework
to develop theories of ‘right action’, that is, an expectation as to what the different
groups could be expected to do. Without such a theory of ‘right action’, it is difficult to
develop a good understanding of what the group should be expected to do versus what
it has been found to be doing. Understanding the differences between the two provides
insight into the rationale and motivation for decisions made by critical players on the
behalf of the accounting profession. It also provides a richer understanding of the warp
and woof of accounting life, as seen through the play of attention on the values versus
4 We conducted an extensive search of the professional and academic literatures, including searches of
Google books using Google’s https://books.google.com/ngrams/info book search facility, searching for
mentions of Spacek’s (1958) accounting court proposal. We found next to none in the practitioner literature.
There was a good bit more in the academic literature, with the key articles cited here.
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Table 1 Formal specifications of the participants, their values and operational goals
Values

Operational goals

1. Investors

1. Optimize allocation of capital in
the capital markets

1. Have a comprehensive set of
financial reporting standards aimed
at promoting both financial
statement comparability between
companies, and financial statement
consistency across time for the
same company

2. Creditors

2. Maximize wealth of shareholders

2. Have independent auditor certify
financial statements with respect to
their conformity to GAAP

3. Congress

3. Ensure fairness in access to
information

3. Enact laws that punish behaviors
that hinder equal access to
information about companies

4. SEC

4. Minimize the economic gains to
perpetrator of information
asymmetry

4. Have monitoring systems in place
to police auditor and client
behaviors with respect to laws
governing publicly traded securities

1. The autonomy of the accounting
profession should be maintained

1. Create program of self-regulation
(e.g., FASB, ASB)

2. The public image of the
accounting profession should be
preserved from damage

2. Have active program to promote
positive views of accounting
profession

3. The existence of the accounting
profession should be maintained

3. Enact laws to diminish the
possibility that audit firms will be
sued; promote availability of the
limited liability partnership for
CPA firms; enact standards of
conduct that can be used as
defensible guidelines for behavior
by CPAs and constitute the ‘state of
the art’ in auditing; promote 150 h
rule for certification as a CPA

4. The financial prosperity of major
accounting firms should be
promoted

4. Seek expanded markets for CPA
firm services

1. Peer auditing firms

1. Gaining a competitive edge over
other auditors

1. Look for weaknesses in other CPA
firm’s client lists

2. Focal auditing firm

2. Retaining own client base

2. Burnish one’s reputation for
excellence in provision of services

3. Being prosperous

3. Avoid damage to one’s own
reputation

4. Fostering a positive professional
reputation

4. Create incentive schemes that
foster individual activity aimed at
fulfilling operational goals and
values

Values group A

Values Group B
1. AICPA

Values Group C
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Table 1 continued
Values

Operational goals

5. Acting in
accordance with
professional values
6. Fostering the
well-being of
members of the firm
7. Promoting the
stature of the
profession
Values Group D
1. Focal client

1. Survive

1. Have financial statements
that look good to potential
investors and creditors

2. Maximize returns
of management as
well as shareholders

2. Attract new investments
and resources

3. Maximize size of
firm

3. Find profitable outlets for
corporate resources
available for investments

4. Protect employment
of employees

4. Discourage purveyors of
potentially bad or negative
news about the company
5. Have an auditor whose
imprimatur lends credibility
to the financial statements
6. Not receive qualified or
adverse audit opinion
7. Be an attractive takeover
target for other companies

Values Group E
1. Potential clients of focal audit firm

1. Have a positive
reputation in the
community

1. Have financial statements
that look good to potential
investors and creditors

2. Other clients

2. Maximize the size
of the firm

2. Attract new investments
and resources

3. Protect employment
of employees

3. Find profitable outlets for
corporate resources
available for investments

4. Maximize the
well-being of
management as well
as shareholders

4. Discourage purveyors of
potentially bad or negative
news about the company
5. Have an auditor whose
imprimatur lends credibility
to the financial statements
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Table 1 continued
Values

Operational goals
6. See a competitor suffer from
mishaps, including negative audit
reports
7. Attract capital away from
competitors
8. Be attractive takeover target for
other firms

Adapted from Kleinman and Palmon (2000)

actions of key accounting institutions and players.5 A key outcome, then, is a better
understanding of any contradiction between the values and actions of key players.
The key players in the financial field (e.g., the SEC, AICPA, FASB, and investors
and creditors) have values that should be supportive of the establishment of an accounting court. For example, according to this categorization, they all have values that state
that the quality of financial reporting is important. Yet, our review of the literature
revealed that there has been little or no comment by any of these individuals in support of the accounting court. It is possible, of course, that the Kleinman and Hossain
(2009) specification of values and goals is incomplete. Perhaps additional considerations would include the economic efficiency of adding an accounting court to the
regulatory mix and/or the potential threat to the supremacy and ultimate authority of
each of these institutions that an accounting court would introduce. Group A in the
Kleinman/Palmon rendering, for example, consists of investors, creditors, the SEC and
Congress.6 We do not address Congress in this paper since it has an all-encompassing
power over the standard setting process and is so driven by internal power and party
conflicts, as well as by internal differences generated by lobbying and home districtbased interest groups, that it cannot be analyzed meaningfully (Kleinman and Hossain
2009). All three remaining component groups within this subjective collectivity formally have commitments to greater financial transparency. One of these components,
however, the SEC, may regard the institution of an accounting court as a potential
threat to its dominance over the field of financial reporting. The existence of such a
court would allow an independent body of experts to issue opinions that might contradict findings of the SEC’s Division of Corporate Finance. While, as Palmon et al.
(2011) found, the SEC has the power to influence the workings of the FASB, this might
not be the case with the accounting court, an entity over which the SEC would have
no formal power. Unlike the SEC, populated by politically appointed commissioners,

5 The development of such a richer understanding should, of course, be useful to later scholars of accounting
institutions, seeking to understand in even greater depth how various actors within the accounting world
are motivated and behave.
6 We relied on the values groupings of Kleinman and Palmon (2000) rather than Kleinman and Hossain
(2009) because Kleinman and Palmon’s value groupings were more compact and to the point. Kleinman and
Hossain (2009), however, do provide valuable information as to how to derive values for value groupings
in the accounting domain. The theory behind the value groupings, of course, is rooted in Shakun (1988).
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the accounting court might possess greater moral authority given a (hoped for) lack
of ties to politics and politicians.7,8
6.1 Financial Accounting Standards Board
While the FASB does, and the accounting court would, consist of experts in the field,
the institutional imperatives of each may differ. The FASB officially sets ‘the rules’ for
corporate accounting going forward after seeking broad input through its due process
procedure. Such input comes, in part, from comment letters provided by interested
parties. Those comment letters, it should be noted, often consist of letters proffered by
those who would be negatively affected by any proposed change, with the provision
of the letters to the FASB instigated by interest groups or commercial associations
believing their members or constituents likely to be injured by a proposed change (e.g.,
Kleinman and Hossain 2009). As Palmon et al. (2011) show, the SEC also provides
substantial input into the FASB decision process. In the United States, it is the SEC
that has the formal grant of authority to set accounting standards, an authority that it
exercises by vetting FASB standards and putting its authority behind them. Special
cases, as it were, are not the subjects of the FASB standard setting unless comment
letters raise specific issues that the FASB is willing to address.
Such a procedure differs from what would be expected with an accounting court, a
court in which the matching of specific fact patterns to standards would be the heart of
the issue. The remit of the accounting court, unlike the FASB, would be to find logical
consistency between the specific situation and the broader area. Ronald Dworkin,
writing in the area of the philosophy of the law (Kleinman et al. 2014), notes that
judges are often in the position of having to decide cases in which there is no law. That
is, there are no statutes or prior case law upon which the judge can base a decision.
Dworkin calls this deciding (in an area) where the law runs out. While Spacek had
argued that the accounting court could amass evidence and theory enabling broader
understanding and application of extant standards to future fact patterns, less broad
constructions are also possible. Having an accounting court make decisions in areas
where the law runs out seems a particularly apt use of the accounting court. It is one
that does not necessarily conflict with the remit of the FASB or the SEC. Yet, to the
extent that we can determine, the FASB has been silent about the accounting court.
The FASB includes among its goals the fostering of transparency in financial reporting. Would not the exploration of how, or whether, specific fact patterns (that would be
the province of an accounting court) relate to FASB standards generate useful information that would help the FASB as it researches updating of its standards? Even if
the accounting court was not used to fill in the gaps in GAAP, or make ‘law’ where
the ‘law’ runs out, would not its exploration of fact patterns and their relationship to
7 The devil, of course, may lie in the details as to how the members of such an accounting court are selected!
8 Issues as to the consistency of professional judgments across time or across experts are beyond the scope

of this paper. Studies of expert judgment both within accounting and out have demonstrated that even
the judgments of identified experts reviewing identical stimuli differ markedly (for a literature review, see
Kleinman et al. 2010). Conflicting court decisions in 2013 as to the legality of key components of the
Affordable Care Act (a.k.a., Obamacare) are an instance of this.
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adopted standards add information to later FASB deliberations? In funded contests of
fact and standards argued before accounting courts, the brightest and hardest working
minds in accounting academia might be brought to bear, arguing on either side for the
outcome desired. Whereas the FASB, through the Financial Accounting Foundation,
is funded through fees paid by issuers per the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, using the
accounting court to generate transcripts enables recruitment of academics (paid by
one side or the other) to develop evidence supportive of the respective positions of the
parties. Unlike FASB due process procedures, this enables the search for the ‘truth’
supposedly redolent of actual court procedures to take place through the contest of
adversaries, each seeking their preferred outcome. Academic researchers, by contrast,
rarely contribute comment letter responses to FASB exposure drafts (e.g., Kleinman
and Hossain 2009, a finding reinforced by our perusal of more recent standards than
those perused in Kleinman and Hossain). Partisans of specific practices, for example,
bank CEOs and board members, often do participate, seemingly in response to interest
group campaigns. It would seem that having the accounting court available to explore
contentious issues involving the application of standards would be useful to the FASB,
yet, there is no word from them on this.
A potential objection from the FASB’s point of view could be that the existence of an
accounting court might set up an additional, alternate, center of standard-setting power.
The FASB’s world, accordingly, may become more complicated with the imposed
greater accountability and the need to think through issues even more thoroughly. It
is not clear that this would be a bad thing to have happen. Also, to the extent that
the FASB’s values include information transparency and provision to the market of
accounting numbers that promote accurate accountability, why would the FASB not
welcome the challenge?
Self-interest may play an important part in FASB’s lack of reported interest in the
accounting court proposal. In our research on the history of the accounting court, this
has not been remarked upon. What might form the unspoken fundaments of a FASB
rejection of the accounting court? Such objections might include:
• The role of the Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) as a body that vets new ideas
for further exploration by the FASB, vitiating the perceived need for an accounting
court (Golden and Ucuzoglu 2013)
• A desire to maintain control of the standard-setting process by stifling potential
contestants for the role that the FASB already occupies. That is, a wariness of
creating a triangle between the SEC, the FASB and an accounting court
• A belief that the contests of will, facts and theory that would take place in the
accounting court, do not materially improve on the process currently used by the
FASB.
A question for the field is: if the FASB were truly committed to transparency of
the standard-setting process and were truly interested in fostering the best possible
accounting standards, would it not support the accounting court concept? If the FASB
conducted two separate cost-benefit analyses with respect to the accounting court,
one analysis based on benefit/cost to accounting standard setting itself, and the other
analyses undertaken with regard to whether the FASB, as an institution, would be hurt,
would the points in the two analyses completely overlap? Would the same result hold
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if the thumb-on-the-scale of motivated reasoning, reasoning influenced by one’s own
interests and how these could be hurt or furthered by coming to a certain conclusion
could be filtered from the mix?
6.2 Securities and Exchange Commission
The SEC also has been silent on the accounting court question. The SEC has the specific
power to set accounting standards. The SEC is accountable to the US Congress for
the resultant standards, even if the FASB wrote the standards and these standards
were given SEC approval (e.g., Kleinman and Hossain 2009; Palmon et al. 2011).
Kleinman and Hossain (2009) and Palmon et al. (2011) note that the US Congress (or
members thereof) has used its power to interfere with SEC/FASB operations. As with
our comments on the FASB, it seems that the SEC’s goal of fostering greater corporate
reporting transparency would be aided by the airing of issues in an accounting court. We
find no evidence, though, that the SEC has taken these considerations into account—
based on discoverable public statements. One explanation for both the FASB’s and
the SEC’s reluctance to voice support for the accounting court concept could be the
not-invented-here syndrome.
Surely proposed better standards should be welcomed! The problem, though, is not
whether current standards are great, but whether future versions of the standards would
be better. Should the FASB and its overseer, the SEC, sit with a pat hand or explore
further changes? There is no opportunity to try out alternate standards and see if they
perform better than current standards, although there is obviously some opportunity
to explore the impact of alternate allowed methods on the value relevance of earnings.
If this is true, the impact of accounting research is limited to testing whether a new
standard outperforms an old one, using the criterion of choice. Repealing new standards
that have failed to outperform, or even perform as well as, old standards, is unheard
of. Rather, according to the FASB ‘Rules of Procedure’, the standards are updated or
amended or replaced.
Compustat and other databases provide enormous opportunities to test current and
prior standards against stock prices in order to determine the value relevance of separable parts of them. For example, the value relevance of earnings computed according to
current standard A vis a vis former standard B.9 Yet research based on these databases
is not used. Why then would we expect the SEC and FASB to support the creation of
an accounting court? The accounting court would provide a venue to which auditing
firms and auditing clients could bring disputes for airing and decision. Over time, it
would build a database of casework illustrating the pitfalls of application and interpretation of specific standards to specific fact patterns. It would, in the process, bring
to bear the adversarial ‘search for truth’ ideally sought in the US court system (e.g.,
Kleinman et al. 2012). The process of argument and disputation, use of expert witnesses, and well-honed in-house and hired-external audit and client experts would
bring further intellectual clarity to the standard-at-issue’s application. The existence
of an accounting court might help defeat the baleful effects of groupthink (Janis 1982)
9 Assuming, to the extent possible, controls for time period or other relevant factors.
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on decision-making by the FASB or the SEC itself. While the notion of an outside
‘challenge’ might trigger in-group defensiveness, it might also trigger even greater
scrutiny as to the sense and probable impact of existing standards and proposed standards. One never knows until one tries.
Accounting researchers, like other researchers, are cautioned against generalizing
from anecdotal evidence. An old cliché is that hard cases make bad law (http://www.
phrases.org.uk/meanings/hard-cases-make-bad-law.html). That is, cases that are very
difficult in and of themselves, do not provide great grist for the creation of a law to
cover entities and behaviors which do not have the particularly difficult configuration
of the difficult case.
In addition, it may be the case that the SEC—staffed by lawyers and accountants—
has the ability to vet corporate accounting reporting practice itself and therefore may
see no need for an accounting court. What such a court may do, though, is expose the
corporate and auditor reasoning behind disputes to the public eye and, in the process,
bring an independent view to the SEC’s own consideration of the matter, should the
matter rise to its attention. We know of no study that has looked at the operation of
the SEC’s Division of Corporate Finance (DCF). There is no information regarding
the consistency or quality of DCF decisions, if the Division works according to the
relevant schedule. Freedom of Information Act requests might produce evidence from
internal reports. We have seen no evidence of such requests in the public record. The
accounting court has been characterized as potential sand in the oyster, an irritant that
can give rise to something of great value. Such an outcome would stem from the independent point of view the judge or panel would bring to evaluating cases brought to
the court. Such an independent view may not be welcomed. In addition, institutional
imperatives may interfere with the willingness of the SEC, along with even more critical regulatory institutions, to seek to become more effective. Little (2012) describes
the work of a leading organizational researcher, Charles Perrow, on the inability of
large regulatory organizations to deal with the challenges before them. Little states:
“…large regulatory organizations… have proven politically inept…” in accomplishing the tasks assigned them. Perrow is said to attribute these failures to (a) economic
and political power’s influence on the regulatory process, resulting in regulatory capture; (b) the impact of Congress on the process, including fears that committee chair
people will lose oversight responsibilities for important societal/economic functions;
(c) the continuing controversy as to the role of government in regulating the economy;
and more generally, (d) the ability of business to push back against attempts to regulate it. At the organizational level, therefore, there may be many impediments to the
SEC pursuing effective implementation of its operational goals in order to achieve its
terminal values of transparency and accurate disclosure.
Organizations are composed of constituent individuals influenced by the organizational control systems, culture, climate and sense-making apparatuses to act
generally in accordance with organizational diktat (e.g., Kleinman and Palmon 2001).
That said the organization’s behavior is also the culmination of the behavior of its
constituent individuals. As these individuals are exposed to influences outside the
remit of the organization, the so-called web within which Kleinman and Palmon
(2001) claimed professionals are immersed, the incentives of these individuals matter too. For example, the individual incentives of SEC staffers have come under
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much criticism of late. It has been argued that the SEC (e.g., Smith, 4/9/14 at
http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2014/04/sec-lawyer-on-goldman-cdo-case-describ
es-how-the-agency-wimped-out.html) has been the victim of regulatory capture, with
the once feared agency now staffed by individuals who have their eyes on the exits,
and on the lucrative careers that await staffers who transit to the corporate venue
or to white-shoed law firms. With popular disdain for government and government
staffers, as well as the relative impoverishment of life on government salaries, such
movement is understandable. This reality, though, does not bode well for aggressive
enforcement. Further, in an age when SEC aggressiveness may lead to SEC staff and
commissioners being called before congressional committees, avoiding the limelight
may seem advisable. Having an independent entity like the accounting court raises an
additional independent voice whose opinions may embarrass the SEC. Such an independent court may imply that the SEC does not have the intellectual firepower, will
and drive to explore needed issues in depth. Accordingly, why would the SEC support
the creation of an independent accounting court? In the contest between operational
and terminal values on the one hand, and the survival instinct on the other, values of
transparency and disclosure may not prevail.

6.3 Investors and Creditors
Investors and creditors, like the SEC and FASB, are presumed to have an interest in
corporate reporting transparency. In this regard, though, we take exception to Kleinman and Hossain’s (2009) categorization and note the more nuanced discussion of
Kleinman et al. (2012). According to Kleinman and Palmon’s, and then later Kleinman and Hossain’s, value/goal analysis (Shakun 1988), investors and creditors are
interested in accurate financial disclosure. The more nuanced discussion in Kleinman
et al. (2012), however, holds that investors and creditors’ wishes may bifurcate based
on whether they already hold the stock or bond—and may be damaged by a disclosure
or change in accounting method, or whether they are potential purchasers of the stock
or bond and may choose to either drop plans to buy the security in reaction to the
information or decide to buy it at the lower price even given the new information.
Such individuals, especially if they enjoy ‘getting into the weeds’ of a company’s
information, may wish to see the disclosures that may be released from the accounting court. Such disclosures may provide them with a richer information set to use in
making their investment decisions.
In effect, one part of the investor community may have interests at variance with
the other part. No one in the investor community is likely to stand up and state that
they prefer less information rather than more because their investments would suffer
should a richer information set be made available. This is contra-normative for a
market capitalist society, especially one embedded in a larger philosophical project
of ‘free speech.’ Accordingly, there would be a lack of unanimity within the investor
community. Need there be uniformity behind, or opposition to, an accounting court?
No. Still, in our research we find no expressions of support for the concept. Perhaps
investor organizations were, and still are, unaware of Leonard Spacek’s concept. Or,
perhaps, the investor organizations were, or are, aware of the concept but believe that
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it fails some cost-benefit test. We have seen no specification in the literature of what
such a test would be. Given that the funding for an accounting court may come from
foundations or the disputants, it is difficult to see what exactly is encompassed by the
‘cost’ side of the ledger. In addition, the party bringing the case seemingly is choosing
to provide the information relevant to the proceeding and the counterpart party—not
resigning from the audit or firing the auditor as the case may be—is choosing to provide
the information as well, in order to remain in the case.
It seems, therefore, the information provided would be for most the equivalent of a
free lunch. It could be argued that the investors are not making the decision to participate in the court proceeding, yet their investment’s proprietary information is being
released and hiring accounting experts is costly. Ergo, the investors ultimately pay the
bill. The current investor group may fear public disclosure of information damaging
to the worth of their investments or they may feel that pursuing the case would help
avert potentially nasty consequences from an auditor-initiated writedown or adjustment. In addition, since the accounting court case decision presumably will be needed
before the corporate financials are ‘put to bed’, the timing aspects of solicitation of
investor input, tallying of results, conducting an authorized accounting court venture,
and then completion of the financials will be a problem. In this regard as well, what
of the interests of the potential shareholder group? How would their interests’ best be
(a) served and (b) discovered? Never having owned the stock, they could not ‘vote
with their feet’ in a detectable manner. Even observations of short selling and put/call
activities may indicate changes in expectations for the firm, but not necessarily the
reasons for these changes. While the financial press will frequently state that a stock
price drop occurs due to some information release, the press cannot actually know
this. All it does know is that information was released—and the stock price dropped.
Assertions as to causation may reflect a post hoc, ergo, propter hoc, analytic flaw. It
seems, therefore, that the groups (potential future investors) who have the greatest
interest in ascertaining the ‘truth’ of the would-be investment’s financial value could
not express that interest.
Our review of published remarks of the accounting court revealed its reference
in academic work and in publications of Arthur Andersen, a firm now functionally
defunct for some 14 years. We did not find mention of it in the investor, nor practitioner,
press. This suggests that an additional explanation for the accounting court proposal
failing to be seriously considered in recent years is that the investors are unaware of
its existence. The world of the Internet is vast, extraordinarily well populated with
information. Regrettably, unless one knows something exists, it is difficult to know
to search for it. Also, as the Internet operates, information seekers are bubbled based
on the search engines’ prior knowledge of their searches. Accordingly, the world an
information seeker sees differs from that seen by another with a different search history.
The upshot, then, is a lack of information on old stories that might be relevant in a
more modern age.
Perhaps, though, all of these parties believe the current arrangements work well.
We do not know. The political effort that would be required to establish an accounting
court probably would be very costly. This would be the result of not only the need to
generate a popular understanding at least within the political and economic elites—of
what the accounting court would do and why it would be needed, but also in terms of
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making enemies of whichever groups might have opposed the accounting court. Even
if all investor/creditor groups supported the establishment of an accounting court,
however, the nature of the court, with the need for perhaps only episodic activities,
suggests that the effort to overcome potential opposition of the SEC and the rest of the
regulatory establishment would become too costly and might endanger other interests
that these investor groups possess.

6.4 American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
The AICPA is the sole organization in Kleinman and Palmon’s (2001) Value Group
B. Its operational goals are said to include creating a program of self-regulation and
promoting positive views of the accounting profession. These operational goals are
presumed to lead to the value goals of maintaining the autonomy of the profession,
preserving the profession’s good image in the eyes of the public and taking steps to
help ensure that it would be difficult to sue profession members. In the wake of the
Enron and Worldcom financial reporting fiascos, self-regulation of public company
auditing was taken by Congress from the profession and handed to the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the overseer of the new Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). If self-regulation is a key aspect of being a profession, then the
profession lost a key aspect of its ability to self-regulate its auditing function. Instead
of so much decision-making taking place within the halls of the profession, it was
moved to the marble corridors of the SEC and the newly-created PCAOB. Decisionmaking over private company standards, however, remained with the AICPA. Since
private companies are typically the least remarkable companies in the US, particularly
with regard to size, this marks quite a comedown for the profession. A great deal of
autonomy was lost as Congress sought to use the new PCAOB and updated SEC to
avert future auditing and financial accounting-based scandals. Concomitant with the
loss of autonomy, the public image of the profession was severely damaged.
Under these circumstances, then, it may have seemed to be natural for the AICPA to
work hard to achieve the third value goal, protection of the profession from litigation.
Such an expectation is even more insistent due to the destruction of Arthur Andersen
at the hands of law enforcement and later the punishments delivered to KPMG for
its forays into apparently illicit tax shelter provision (e.g., BloombergBusinessWeek,
8/31/2005). Regulation is sometimes said to provide a shield to practitioners because
proven adherence to regulatory requirements shows the practitioner’s good faith and
documented adherence to the state of the art, as embodied in the regulations (e.g.,
Anderson and Wolfe, 9/1/2002). Fitting the accounting court into such a scheme is
more difficult. If the AICPA’s goal is to avoid litigation against auditors and to promote
a positive view of the profession, then one potentially positive role that an accounting
court could play would be to have an additional source of scrutiny of auditor behavior
upon whose lap the auditor could leave judgment as to the proper course of action in
unclear circumstances. Whichever way the accounting court ruled, the auditor would
be protected just as long as it went along with the ruling. If, for example, the auditor
preferred a more conservative accounting treatment than did the client and the accounting court ruled for the client, then the auditor could safely give up its opposition and
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look to the ruling of the accounting court as its justification. However, if the accounting court ruled for the auditor, then the auditor’s position would be strengthened and
client resistance to the ruling might place the client in legal jeopardy should it insist on
the court-denied accounting treatment. Given the fortification of the auditor’s position
and the position of the court, client opinion shopping would be more difficult in that
potential new auditors would be under an implied threat of sanction should they give
into the desires of a client which has just been told it is wrong by the accounting court.
Kleinman and Palmon (2000, 2001) had argued that the existence of a known SEC
negative position on a matter of importance to the client, a client position that the
auditor itself disdained, led to the conflict between the auditor and the client being
reframable as a conflict between the client and the SEC. Given that even more unsophisticated clients would know of the power of the SEC, the true conflict becomes
one between the SEC and the client, not the client and the auditor. Thus, the auditor
becomes spared the obloquy that the client might render, with the incumbent auditor’s
position becoming stronger because rival audit claimants would be hesitant to buck a
known SEC position.
The accounting court itself could come to occupy that SEC position. If a matter is
brought before it and it rules, then that ruling becomes public knowledge and reinforces
the position of the auditor or the client, on whosoever’s behalf the judgment was
rendered. Why then do we not see AICPA advocacy for the accounting court? It is
possible that the history of Spacek’s accounting court proposal stands in the way.
According to Zeff (2001), Spacek launched the accounting court proposal because he
was angry at a wrong opinion rendered by a particular AICPA body, this in addition
to Spacek’s rejection of the narrow, ad hoc, nature of Committee on Accounting
Procedure standard-setting. According to Zeff’s accounting, the AICPA took steps to
expel Spacek from the institute, a threat lifted when Spacek agreed to join the AICPA
committee that ultimately led to the creation of the Accounting Principles Board.10
It is unlikely that, even if remembered, this affected the AICPA in relation to the
accounting court.
One issue for the AICPA may be that of control. As the accounting profession’s
public face and dominant private organization, it has historically wielded a great deal
of control over the happenings within the profession and heavily influenced discourse
about the profession. Accepting a new external body, such as an accounting court, that
would influence both accounting standards and auditing practice would provide that
body with a great deal of influence on the further development of the profession. Influence garnered by the accounting court would not redound to the benefit of the AICPA’s
hope to control discourse on the future of the profession. There would, therefore, be
both plusses and minuses to the accounting court from the AICPA’s point of view. On
the one hand, the accounting court would help protect AICPA constituents from litigation or destructive internal-to-the-profession competition, as well as support AICPA
10 Spacek was later to say of this board that “...The accounting profession should be establishing appropriate standards to give true purpose and meaning to the much used term ‘generally accepted accounting
principles.’ Instead, we continue to receive a flood of unrelated and unsupported directives from the APB
which further pollute fair financial reporting to the public. ...the system is so involved in trivia that it can’t
identify simple, basic, and honest principles”.
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constituents in their struggles with clients. On the other hand, the accounting court
would be a creature of its creators and while the AICPA might number among these, it
might not control the process. It is also possible, given the nature of a proposed body—
the accounting court—that would have to draw on a variety of expertise to meet the
challenges of its caseload, that the accounting court itself may be completely outside
the AICPA’s influence. If so, it would further diminish the stature of the AICPA, much
as the creation of the PCAOB under, ultimately, federal aegis, diminished the control
of the AICPA over auditing standards (Carmichael and Graham 2012). The declared
goal of harmonization of AICPA Auditing Standards Board standards with those of
the International Federation of Accountants’ International Standards on Auditing also
marks a reduction in the ability of the AICPA to unilaterally affect the course of the
profession in the United States.

6.5 Audit Firms
According to the Kleinman and Palmon (2000), audit firms constitute Value Group C.
The audit firm terminal values include developing a positive professional reputation,
acting in accordance with professional values, fostering the well-being of firm members, and promoting the stature of the profession. Our normative supposition is that
developing a positive professional reputation is most consistent with living up to the
values of the profession. Those values are always described in textbooks, and leader
of the profession speeches as acting in the public interest (e.g., Hanson, 12/9/2014).
The controversies over auditor independence of clients and quality of services that
have dogged the auditing firms for years can hardly be said to be conducive to promoting the stature of the profession (e.g., The Economist, 12/13/14). One might expect,
therefore, that the auditing firms would seriously consider how an accounting court
would influence the stature of the profession and whether it would promote their own
positive professional reputation.
The auditing firms have largely been silent with respect to the creation of the
accounting court. In one respect, this might be regarded as odd given that the original
impetus for the creation of the accounting court came from Leonard Spacek, the
managing partner of Arthur Andersen in 1958, the year Spacek proposed the court.
Now, with both Spacek deceased and Arthur Andersen existing largely as a memory
of a once prestigious firm gone awry, there is no one in practice to urge the idea.
Academics, like Friedland (2004), may urge the notion, but as the Pathways (2012)
commission notes, academic research (and, we add, enthusiasm) frequently fail to
impact the practitioner world. In another respect, the rationale for the accounting court
is the need for a forum within which accounting firms and their clients can contest their
differences, enabling the judge(s) to discern from the conflicting accounting theories
and facts what would be the appropriate treatment of problematic transactions.
Having such a court exposes the inner life of the auditor-client firm relationship.
Such exposure, certainly in the wake of the FTC effort in the 1970s to promote auditor
solicitation of clients from other auditing firms, may provide nonincumbent auditing firms with information that may lead the incumbent audit firm to lose the client
involved. Unless issues are cut-and-dried, auditing firms may fear that nonincumbent
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auditing firms may tailor their approaches to the client by presenting arguments for
the client’s position. The accounting court, therefore, may make it easier for the nonincumbent auditing firm to engage in artfully-phrased opinion proferring instead of
the client engaging in opinion shopping.
Thus, while the Kleinman and Palmon (2000) rendition of the terminal values of
auditing firms includes acting in accordance with professional values, other elements
of the auditing firm’s values may be in conflict with that. For example, the auditor
does want to retain its own client base, be prosperous and foster the well-being of
members of the firm. Taking a case to an accounting court may, or may not, foster
the professional reputation of the firm. It may foster the professional reputation of the
firm if the step of confronting the client in front of an accounting court demonstrates
the auditor’s independence. The same act, however, given the nature of litigation, may
result in damaging accusations against the auditing firm by a client anxious to have its
will prevail. This argument may not hold if other auditing firms restrain themselves or
could be expected to restrain themselves should another auditing firm be challenged.
After all, ‘there but for the grace of God go I’.
Solidarity of such a sort might prevail if auditing firms saw themselves as sharing
a common fate. After all, the Big 4 (then 5) was united in opposing the reforms to
the provision of consulting services advocated by then SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt
in 2000 (e.g., SEC, 5/15/2000). The proposed reforms would have limited the ability
of the auditing firms to provide certain consulting services. In that sense, the loss to
one would be the loss to all. That, however, would not be the case with the accounting
court. In its presence, each firm might hope to be relatively more successful poaching
clients from the other engaged in ‘litigation’ with its client. Thus, each may hope to
be the ‘winner’ in a contest of all-against-all. Whether any of them would have been a
net winner in this contest is unknown. Winning means taking a client dissatisfied with
its current auditor’s position and then accepting the client’s position on the accounting
question. It could be argued that cases that come before the accounting court are likely
to be cases in which the weight of the arguments between the parties is somewhat
equal. Would not a good adviser, perhaps one not paid by the hour, advise a client
to drop a contest with the auditor if the auditor possessed a clear advantage in the
logic and substance of the argument against the logic and substance of the client’s
argument? That may very well be so, but human behavior is known to be difficult
and often—to an outsider—can be considered irrational. Individuals become wedded,
invested, in their particular positions and view the arguments of the other through a
funhouse mirror. Each side, therefore, may view its opposite as irrational, or at least
oddly incapable, of matching the facts to the standard.
From an initial disagreement, the conflict may build due to the escalation of commitment phenomenon, giving the conflict a life of its own.11 An outside audit firm,
reviewing the issues at stake and less ego-involved in the dispute may be able to bring
a fresh eye to the dispute and avoid a seemingly irrational buildup of commitment
to a position that the client finds objectionable, and that the other auditing firm finds
unnecessary. The phenomenon of inter-expert disagreement is well known (for a lit11 Escalation of commitment is defined as the tendency to pursue a failed course of action despite evidence
of such failure (e.g., Bazerman et al. 1984).
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erature review, see Kleinman et al. 2010). Accordingly, even apart from pecuniary
motivations to support a rival auditor’s client in a dispute with the auditor, the nonincumbent auditor may indeed agree with the client. Such agreement may exist even
apart from motivated reasoning to gain a client.
In addition, the focal audit firm and its competitors need to be cognizant of the
impact of taking action in the accounting court on competitors of the client the audit
firm is ‘suing’ or is being ‘sued by.’ Taking a client to court may result in current, other,
clients of the litigating audit firm reappraising their willingness to continue with the
auditor. This would be true to the extent that the auditor had not previously signaled
its position on an important accounting issue affecting the client. Clearly, this would
be more likely with a new client in the same industry as the litigating client than a
continuing client.

6.6 Current and Potential Clients
Value Group D and E of the Kleinman and Palmon (2000) paper consisted of current
(Value Group D) and potential (Value Group E) clients of the auditing firm. Members
of these value groups may be either attracted or repelled by the auditor’s position
on the litigation issue. They might be attracted if they saw the auditor’s willingness
to litigate a question with a current client as a sign of the auditor’s integrity. They
might be repelled if they disagreed with the auditor or saw the auditor’s position as
contrary to the potential new client’s own interests. All clients, potential, new and
old, though, may feel threatened by the litigation since a decision against the litigating
client may provide backbone to their current auditors to also resist client importunities
to support questionable accounting positions. As noted above, it is also possible that
other auditing firms simply do not agree with the position of the litigating audit firm
on the accounting problem at issue. The terminal values of these groups include firm
survival, maximization of returns to shareholders and management, and protecting the
employment of employees.
The operational goals include having good-looking financial statements capable of drawing investment resources to the firm, discouragement of purveyors of
bad news and avoiding qualified or adverse opinions, as well as having a prestigious audit firm to confer an unqualified opinion on the client firm. On the one
hand, conflict with the auditor for the incumbent client may draw much unwanted
attention to the client’s financial statements and operations. On the other, the willingness to challenge the auditor in the accounting court, to defend one’s preferred
accounting treatment before an independent tribunal, may generate a very positive
perception of the client firm’s financial statements and of the integrity of management. The display of public information about the firm, of course, may be a big
negative, potentially providing proprietary information to competitors. The competing potential client firms in Value Group E, however, may enjoy the spectacle of
a rival facing its auditor in the accounting court. Such a spectacle would provide
them with information on the litigating auditor’s viewpoint on the accounting issue,
with such a viewpoint they could choose to seek out that auditor or avoid it. A
critical issue here, though, is whether the accounting court’s decisions are binding
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on all client firms (whether of the focal audit firm or not), or just on the litigating client firm. Either way, of course, the argument and ultimate decision reached
by the accounting court could feedforward into future FASB and SEC decisionmaking.
An important question for the focal client firm, the one presumably initiating or
responding to the litigation, is whether an increased perception of the integrity of
its management and financial statements is worth the cost of litigation against the
auditing firm, a firm that can easily be replaced by others perhaps as competent and
perhaps more pliable on the issue at hand. Focal client competitors, those not involved
in the accounting litigation, of course, may gain information by carefully observing the litigation process but may also lose accounting flexibility if the accounting
court rules against a position advocated by the focal client firm that its rivals also
liked. In either case, it is difficult to see why potential focal client firms would be
supportive of the accounting court concept. If a government agency selected auditors for clients, and auditors had a mandatory tenure as auditor, then, with so much
power in the hands of the auditor, an accounting court might be useful in adjusting
the balance of power between the focal auditor and the focal client. Absent tenure
guarantees for the auditor or other compensation for the auditor if it challenged, or
responded aggressively to a challenge from a client, it seems that the accounting
court would be deemed of greater cost than benefit to both focal and potential client
firms.
Our research showed that academics were most likely to advocate for the accounting court. This was a group not mentioned in the work of Kleinman and Palmon,
although it did feature in the work of Kleinman and Hossain. Kleinman and Hossain
argue that the terminal values of academics include obtaining a greater understanding
of the financial accounting standard-setting process, as well as doing research—or
engaging in argumentation—that supports the development of more theoretically adequate financial accounting standards. The authors go on to note that the academics’
operational goals may include “further developing their own professional skills and
understanding, as well as fostering their own professional reputations by taking part in
a potentially public process.” (p. 18). Unlike auditors, clients, and others, academics
are used to the hurly-burly of stated positions contested by others. The publishing
process exposes academics to contrary opinions (i.e., those of the reviewers) with
each round. While making presentations at conferences, challenges from discussants
and the audiences are routine. The wise academic regards the challenges not as threats
but as opportunities to incorporate other, discrepant, insights into the next iteration
of the paper before submission to a publisher. In contrast, perhaps to the corporate
world, an academic’s career is furthered if he/she attends to meaningful comments
and further develops his/her paper. Individuals outside the academy, however, may
take such challenges as threats. Further, academics have as part of their classroom
role development of positions to present to the class, marshalling of evidence to support those positions, and developing responses to the questions asked of the class.
In that sense, the academics are perhaps more used to, and feel less threatened by,
the search for truth through active intellectual engagement than the others herein
described.
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7 Conclusion and Recommendations
In 1958, the then head of the prestigious auditing firm of Arthur Andersen, Leonard
Spacek, suggested the creation of an accounting court. The seeming motivation behind
this suggestion was Spacek’s lack of confidence in the quality of accounting principles
being issued by the Committee on Accounting Procedures (Zeff 2001). Academicians
have touted Spacek’s idea of an accounting court to hear disputes between auditors and
clients and to develop a body of knowledge and theory useful in setting better accounting standards since 1958. It was not, however, positively received by the practitioner
or regulatory community of Spacek’s, day.
Since 1958, however, Spacek’s idea of an accounting court has lived on in the
academic accounting literature. Learned articles have appeared (e.g., Friedland 2004;
Beresford 2004; Kleinman et al. 2012) arguing the need for an accounting court to
help deal with the current standard process’s shortcomings. These academic arguments
never gained traction outside academe, never having been echoed in the practitioner
(other than Arthur Andersen house organs) or regulatory community publications.
In this paper, we use the Kleinman and Hossain (2009) characterization of accounting environment participants’ operational goals and terminal values (based on value
group theory developed in Shakun 1988) to explore why the accounting court suggestion never took flight. We argue that common conditions of existence came between
the operational goals and terminal values expected of players in the accounting standard setting domain and their willingness to seek the specified terminal values. In
this paper, we concentrate on the accounting world as it exists today, populated by
today’s players and today’s concerns. Future efforts to investigate the absence of the
accounting court should consider incorporating a timeline of events, analyzing how
those events affected or failed to affect the introduction of an accounting court.
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